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THE SCREENWRITER'S INDESTRUCTIBLE RIGHT
TO TERMINATE HER ASSIGNMENT OF
COPYRIGHT: ONCE A STORY IS
"PITCHED," A STUDIO CAN NEVER




It is probably not quite fraud, though it comes terribly close to
it, when motion picture and television production companies con-
vince their writers to part with the rights to their stories when they
sign with the companies. Despite contracts that claim the writer
has no rights to the resulting script (either because the author has
assigned his rights "in perpetuity" or because he has agreed to pro-
duce a "work for hire"'), U.S. copyright law provides many authors,
perhaps the vast majority of them, with a future right that cannot
be lost and can always be regained, irrespective of any written con-
tract to the contrary.2 This is, of course, the termination right,3
which provides that approximately thirty-five years after an initial
* Professor of Law, Cleveland State University College of Law, co-author, Intellectual
Property (West 1992). The author would like to thank Jim Kay, of the Writers Guild of
America, for his selfless assistance, although especially in this case it is necessary to state
that none of the views expressed in this article are necessarily shared by him.
A "work made for hire" is -
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her em-
ployment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to
a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a
sound recording, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as
an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the
parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work
shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing
sentence, a "supplementary work" is a work prepared for publication as a secon-
dary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, con-
cluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the
use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations,
maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for
tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an "instructional text" is a
literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the pur-
pose of use in systematic instructional activities.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1997 & Supp. 1999), amended by Intellectual Property and Communica-
tions Omnibus Reform Act of 1999 § 1011, S. 1948, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536
(1999).
2 This is the express language of the statute: "notwithstanding any agreement to the
contrary." Id. § 203(a) (5); see also infra text accompanying note 18.
3 See 17 U.S.C. § 203. See also id. § 304(c).
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assignment the writer has the right to completely terminate that
assignment, even if the assignment contains provisions and qualifi-
cations to the contrary.4
Admittedly, not every writer possesses such a termination
right. But the number of writers who do is immensely larger than
the studios would like to admit, or are even willing to admit.
Simply put, any writer who presents a written treatment in any
form-from the quick "pitch" to the more complex synopsis5 to
what might amount to a complete screenplay-before actually re-
ceiving a commitment from his prospective employer, will have the
right to terminate his assignment of rights to that treatment thirty-
five years later.6 Perhaps most importantly, even if the studio only
receives an oral "pitch," the author can never lose his right to ter-
minate copyright in the underlying story as long as he committed
the story to tangible form7 (at his home or office, for instance)
before delivering the "pitch."' This is because any resulting script,
most likely performed for the studio under a "worker for hire" con-
tract, is nothing more than a derivative of the original treatment.9
While it is true that the studio will retain rights to the script, if
written as a work for hire, and will thus be the "author" of that
script, the studio's rights will be limited to the script and any spin-
offs produced during the thirty-five year period.' The writer can
regain the right to create other works based on his original treat-
ment, as well as all related rights connected with the original
treatment.
This would not be particularly remarkable (because the termi-
4 The statute is quite clear about this. See infra note 10; infra text accompanying notes
15, 16, 23, and 50. Cf infra note 11.
5 Apparently, the Copyright Office might be less than willing to register a synopsis.
"To be acceptable for copyright registration in unpublished form, a script must be more
than an outline or synopsis." COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CIRCULAR 47, RADIO
AND TELEVISION PROGRAMS (1973), cited in Camilla M.Jackson, "I've Got This Great Ideafor a
Movie!" A Comparison of the Laws in California and New York That Protect Idea Submissions, 21
COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 47, 49, n.14 (1996). But refusal to register is not a bar to either
copyrightability or most infringement remedies. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). See also Gucci
Timepieces Am., Inc. v. Yidah Watch Co., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1938 (C.D.Cal. 1998).
6 Thirty-five years is an approximation, since the five-year statutory window during
which termination can be exercised is linked to one of two dates: the date of assignment,
or the date of publication (if any), whichever is earlier. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (3).
7 Tangible forms include a written treatment, or as is typically the case, a series of
index cards, or even an audio tape.
8 The "pitch" is an oral, shortened version of the story the author has written that he
presents to studio executives when he attempts to sell the story to the studio for
production.
9 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "derivative work").
10 The statute contains a kind of savings clause that protects an assignee from losing,
due to an author's exercise of the termination right, the right to continue to use those
derivatives that have already been prepared by the assignee. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1).
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nation right has been part of our copyright law since 1976) except
that motion picture and television studios and production houses
have tried mightily to defeat the termination right and to convince
writers, their labor organizations, and through them, the public,"1
that writers have no such termination right when they work as
"workers for hire." 2 However, as long as the writer has prepared
some kind of written summary or treatment prior to being hired by
the studio, such studio claims are false. The rest of this article ex-
plains why this is so, how the studios have attempted to foreclose
the termination right, the possible limits and implications of the
writer's termination right in that context, and the likely economic
and social effects of a greater awareness of the termination right by
writers and studios.
I. THE TERMINATION RIGHT
The 1976 Copyright Act1 3 was, in many respects, a completely
new statute. At least formally, it neither pretended nor attempted
to build on the 1909 Act.14 Among many other provisions, the ter-
mination right was conceived as a new approach to an old prob-
lem-the tendency of young writers to sell their manuscripts far
too cheaply, before time and growing reputations could enhance
their bargaining positions. 15 Under the termination right, any au-
thor who sells rights (such sales being assignments) to his work of
authorship retains an indefeasible right to terminate such assign-
ments approximately thirty-five years later.16 Congress was protec-
11 New "must buy" items are on Manhattan sidewalks these days, where busy cor-
ners teem with merchants selling children's books, sunglasses and knockoff de-
signer watches. They are movie scripts, "guaranteed authentic" by a man
named Vlady....
Vlady said no one has raised any serious objections, and people who have
worked on the films he stocks have been among his customers. That may be
because authors retain no copyright claims to scripts once studios have
purchased and produced them, said Vito Turso, a spokesman for the Writers
Guild of America, East.
Bernard Stamler, Neighborhood Report: New York Up Close; Screenplays Join 'Rolexes'As Sidewalk
Fare, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, § 14, at 6.
12 See infta Parts IV.A.-B.
13 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
14 Copyright Act, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
15 The statutory history indicates that this, among other reasons, was the intent of Con-
gress. "Congress wanted to give [the author] an opportunity to benefit from the success of
his work and to renegotiate disadvantageous bargains... made at a time when the value of
the work [wa]s unknown or conjectural and the author.., is necessarily in a poor bargain-
ing position." SUBCOMMITrEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE
COMMITrEE OF THEJUDIcIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDIES PRE-
PARED PURSUANT To S. RES. 240, RENEWAL OF COPYRIGHT, STUDY No. 31, at 125 (Comm.
Print 1961) (Barbara Ringer).
16 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (3).
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tive of the author's right to terminate, and expressly stated the
intent that no matter what a prospective purchaser might do, the
author could not lose his right to terminate. 7
Explained briefly, the 1976 Act establishes an indefeasible
right in the author to cancel any and all assignments. Section 203
provides:
(a) Conditions for termination. In the case of any work other
than a work made for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant
of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a copy-
right, executed by the author on or afterJanuary 1, 1978, other-
wise than by will, is subject to termination under the following
conditions:
(3) Termination of the grant may be effected at any
time during a period of five years beginning at the end of
thirty-five years from the date of execution of the grant; or,
if the grant covers the right of publication of the work, the
period begins at the end of thirty-five years from the date of
publication of the work under the grant or at the end of
forty years from the date of execution of the grant, which-
ever term ends earlier.
(5) Termination of the grant may be effected notwith-
standing any agreement to the contrary, including an
agreement to make a will or to make any future grant.
(b) Effect of termination. Upon the effective date of termina-
tion, all rights under this title that were covered by the termi-
nated grants revert to the author, authors, and other persons
owning termination interests under clauses (1) and (2) of sub-
section (a), including those owners who did not join in signing
the notice of termination under clause (4) of subsection (a), but
with the following limitations:
(1) A derivative work prepared under authority of the
grant before its termination may continue to be utilized
under the terms of the grant after its termination, but this
privilege does not extend to the preparation after the ter-
mination of other derivative works based upon the copy-
righted work covered by the terminated grant.
(6) Unless and until termination is effected under this
section, the grant, if it does not provide otherwise, contin-
ues in effect for the term of copyright provided by this
17 "Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the
contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future grant." Id.
§§ 203(a) (5), 304(c) (5).
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tide. i8
Though the termination right appears somewhat radical and
certainly paternalistic, it is not such a complete departure from
preceding law.19 In its effort to regulate the ability of an author to
imprudently assign all of his rights, it certainly departs from the
Anglo-American tradition of freedom of contract, which is inti-
mately a part of the laissez-faire economic traditions and all the
political implications that freedom of contract connotes. But it is
not the first copyright measure to attempt to prevent such impru-
dent assignments. 20 The 1909 Act incorporated a similar approach
by providing for two terms of copyright protection. The second
term, which was renewable by the author, was intended to allow the
author to recapture a copyright that the author may have improvi-
dently assigned during the first term.2 1 However, as is generally
recognized, publishing practices and judicial decisions eventually
undermined that scheme so that an author was allowed to assign,
along with the first term, the rights to the renewed term. 22 In ef-
fect, publishers, being no fools, routinely purchased both terms.
The 1976 Act was written with that failure in mind, and as a result
specifically states that the termination right is to be unaffected by
any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement "to make a
will or to make any future grant."23
The scope of this discussion does not include the detailed pro-
cedures required in order to effectuate the termination right, nor
does it include the many situations in which more than one per-
son's consent may be necessary to terminate, such as in the case of
multiple co-authors, or after death, when various family members
have statutory rights to terminate. Also not treated here are works
originally subject to the 1909 Act, to which authors were granted a
termination right to the extent that those 1909 works still enjoyed
copyright at the time the 1976 Act entered into force. Aside from
those procedural details not addressed here, however, there are
18 Id. § 203.
19 See Copyright Act (1909) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976)).
20 See id.
21 See Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 653 (1943) (citing
legislative history of the 1909 Act); Copyright Act, ch. 320, § 24, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (cur-
rent version at 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1994)).
22 See Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960); Fred Fisher
Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943). See also G. Ricordi & Co. v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1950) (holding that unless an assignment of
copyright includes the renewal term, the assignment term is that of the original copyright).
23 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1997).
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several central features of the termination right which must be
understood.
First, although an author may terminate any and all assign-
ments, termination does not affect the right of an assignee to con-
tinue to exploit whatever derivative works were actually prepared
under the grant prior to termination. 24 This was expressly in-
tended to avoid the somewhat uncoordinated results under the
1909 Act, which the United States Supreme Court interpreted as
allowing authors to be defeased of their rights to the renewal term
by assigning them. 25 The Court did not hold that derivative works
would be protected in any and all circumstances from an author,
or notably an author's estate, who did in fact recover the renewal
term.26 To prevent the apparent inequity of a derivative work
owner losing rights to a heavily-invested exploitation, the 1976 Act
protects completed derivative works from being unseated.27
This is not a minor detail. It means that an author, although
newly possessed of his copyrights thirty-five or so years after origi-
nally assigning them may have rights of very little value. To the
extent that previously-prepared derivative works have exhausted
the market, an author who has terminated the assignment of his
copyrights may not be able to commercially profit from them. On
the other hand, the limits of "prepared" derivative works leave the
author many possibilities. For instance, in theory, any number of
spinoffs, sequels, or character developments are possible. This is
because although the derivative work is safe from the author's ter-
mination rights, to the extent that the underlying preexisting work
was well-developed and to the extent that the derivative work is
truly based upon the underlying work, the author, having regained
copyright in that work, has the right to create, or license others to
create, new derivative works based on the original work.
On the other hand, there will no doubt be severe, perhaps
even fatal, limits upon the author's freedom to exploit the underly-
ing work to the extent that the prepared derivative work(s)
adopted new character names, a new tile, and, especially, to the
extent new matter was added. A canny producer might succeed in
limiting the author's freedom by creating during the rewrite pro-
cess names, titles, and other matter to which public recognition
attaches. Such new expressive features, created within the work-
24 See id. § 203(b)(1).
25 See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990); Miller Music Corp. v. Daniels, Inc.,
362 U.S. 373, 375 (1960); Fisher Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 645 (1943).
26 See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
27 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1).
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for-hire relationship, become parts of the specially commissioned
work for hire.28
Second, although an author can terminate any and all assign-
ments, and as a result, renegotiate such assignments if he wishes,
the effect of the termination procedures is that such an author can-
not renegotiate an assignment with anyone other than the original
assignee until after termination is effective.29 Since termination
cannot be effected without at least a two-year notice, this amounts
to a two-year right of first refusal that the first assignee enjoys de-
spite being potentially terminated.
Third, and probably most importantly, it must be repeated
that works for hire are not subject to the termination right.30 As a
result, most of the battles over termination rights will probably in-
volve attempts to characterize a work as one for hire, thus depriv-
ing the author of any right to terminate.
A. "Spec" Materials
To understand how an author could have a work of author-
ship in which he possesses a termination right when he has been
commissioned to produce a work for hire (which, as a matter of
law, has no termination right), one must understand the mechan-
ics and terminology of the writing industry. Full-length, finished
screenplays start out as something less, or at least something differ-
ent. Where a screenplay derives from a clearly separate and preex-
isting work of authorship, such as a novel, short story, or even
magazine article, there should be no question that the author of
that underlying work possesses an eventual termination right in
that underlying work. But more often, screenplays find their ori-
28 As a counseling matter, canny authors and their canny attorneys would be well-ad-
vised to insist that as many identifying details as possible from the author's original treat-
ment (such as names, which might be readily accepted, and titles, which are often much
more contentious and subject to marketing decisions) appear in the final work so that the
author will have more to claim upon termination.
29 The Copyright Act provides:
A further grant, or agreement to make a further grant, of any right covered by
a terminated grant is valid only if it is made after the effective date of the termi-
nation. As an exception, however, an agreement for such a further grant may
be made between the author or any of the persons provided by the first sen-
tence of clause (6) of this subsection, or between the persons provided by sub-
clause (C) of this clause, and the original grantee or such grantee's successor in
title, after the notice of termination has been served as provided by clause (4)
of this subsection.
Id. § 304(c) (6) (D). As will be seen later on, this is a rather important feature of the termi-
nation right, especially as it affects industry attempts to circumvent the right. See infra text
accompanying note 121.
30 By the statute's express terms, the termination right applies only to "any work other
than a work made for hire." 17 U.S.C. § 203(a).
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gin in a verbal presentation to studio executives. Here, the author
presents his "pitch," or shortened version of the proposed work, to
the studio. Usually, the author has already prepared his work in
some written format, most often in the form of three-by-five index
cards."' The most common form is the "step outline," in which the
story is told in steps using huge stacks of file cards, sometimes sev-
eral hundred per stack. 2 An alternative is what is currently termed
a "treatment," which some consider a mere outline, consisting of
ten or twelve pages.33 What others consider a more traditional
"treatment" may amount to as many as 100 double-spaced typewrit-
ten pages, but this appears to be a thing of the past." One stan-
dard industry reference work defines a treatment as "typically 20-40
pages long with plot, characters, locations and samples of dialogue
. . . .,, "In the studio system of the 1930s to the 1950s when produ-
cers ordered treatments from writers, they were often two hundred
to three hundred pages long. The strategy of studio writers was to
extract the screenplay from a much larger work so nothing would
be overlooked or unthought."3 6
The fact that authors who create a written version before be-
ing commissioned retain a termination right in the final screenplay
would not be important were it not for the fact that the vast major-
ity of motion pictures find their start in that way. In 1997, the ma-
jor motion picture studios produced 146 films.3 7 Only seven were
the product of in-house development.38  Of the remaining 139
films, sixty-two were from "spec scripts."3 9 Most, if not all, of the
writers of those scripts probably believe, and their contracts cer-
31 See ROBERT McKEE, STORY 412 (1997).
32 See id.
33 See id. at 414-15.
34 See id. at 415 (noting that during the days of the studio system, treatments were
"often two hundred to three hundred pages long").
35 Alexander Lindey, Lindey on Entertainment, Publishing and the Arts (MB) Form 8-1
cmt. 2, at 8-20 (Mar. 1995).
36 McKEE, supra note 31, at 415.
37 See Dan Cox, H'Wood Hunts 'The Great Idea, 'VARIETY, Feb. 1998, at 1.
38 See id.
39 See id The remaining unaccounted for difference between the 146 total films and 62
"spec scripts," 17 "pitches" and only seven "in house" projects, is explained by the fact that
a great number of scripts fall under other categories which, though not "in house" are also
not, strictly speaking, "spec" projects. These include, for instance, films based on books,
articles (a large number and tremendously profitable), and cartoons (which, though small
in number, were tremendously profitable in 1997). For purposes of this article, however, it
is central to understand that virtually all, if not all, of those other projects, precisely be-
cause they are not "in house," may involve underlying works to which the original author
may have termination rights. In other words, with the exception of the seven "in house"
projects, the studios may lose rights to the underlying works for nearly all their other films
in 35 years.
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tainly claim, that they sold "all rights" to the studio.40 A full twelve
percent-seventeen or so-of that year's films were the products of
"pitches" to studio executives, and those films brought in fifteen
percent of the year's revenues.4' Whether the issue is "spec" scripts
in general or "pitches" specifically, authors will eventually own the
rights in the underlying works for an impressive majority of all
films made, thirty-five years hence, if 1997 is any example of how
the film industry works over time. And, there is no reason to think
these figures are unrepresentative.
The situation in the television industry seems similar:
During 1988 there were 8,000 to 10,000 pitches at CBS for mov-
ies of the week; fifty movies were made, slightly less than the
year before. When an author goes in to pitch a movie for televi-
sion, it would be effective if he left behind a page the network
executive could refer to, even though it's against Writers Guild
regulations. (It's considered speculative writing.) Usually, in a
pitch meeting, the executive has a secretary or assistant take
notes, then type them up for later reference.4 2
In terms of the actual process of submitting a "spec" script,
there are a wide number of possibilities, but they generally fall into
a relatively small number of standard industry categories. Perhaps
the most common is the "pitch" whereby a very condensed version
of a story is presented to a studio representative in a rather short
amount of time.4" On the other hand, the "pitch" is often
presented using standard index cards upon which the author has
arranged the entire story line, character development, scenes, and
even occasional dialog.44 Whether prepared first on three-by-five
cards, in outline form, or by some other method, it appears certain
that the "pitch" contains enough material beyond mere ideas to
constitute a copyrightable work of authorship. In one form or an-
other, by the time the author presents his "pitch" to the studio, he
has already developed the following elements: story line, plot, char-
acters complete with biography, dramatic conflict, and resolu-
40 See infra Part IV.
41 See id.
42 SYD FIELD, SELLING A SCREENPLAY. THE SCREENWRITER'S GUIDE TO HOLLYWOOD 177
(1989). The reader should note that in this situation, even if the author had not fixed the
story in writing or otherwise, the acts of the secretary here would consitute the authorized
fixation necessary to secure the author's copyright and corresponding termination right.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
43 See FIELD, supra note 42, at 136; McKEE, supra note 31, at 413-14. Buchwald v. Para-
mount Pictures, Corp. is a good example in which a three-page "treatment" was used for
the "pitch." See 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1497 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 1990).
44 See FIELD, supra note 42, at 136.
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tion.4 5 As one industry guide for authors states, "You've got to put
in the time -and structure your idea, outlining the action and build-
ing the character into a narrative story line with beginning, middle,
and end."46
It appears that the elements of story and character presented
in the typical "pitch" have more than enough specificity, or sub-
stantive expression, to pass any test of copyrightability.47 And,
although copyrightability and infringement are separate concepts,
it is clear that the typical "pitch" contains enough to support a later
claim of infringement as well.
Hand's suggestion that a number of different patterns at differ-
ent levels of abstraction will fit any work must be combined with
Chafee's suggestion that the operative pattern for purposes of
determining substantial similarity is one that is in some degree
abstract (omitting dialogue, minor incidents, possibly setting,
etc.), but is nevertheless sufficiently concrete so as to contain an
expression of the sequence of events and the interplay of the
major characters.48
Since the typical "pitch" appears to satisfy the test of having
"an expression of the sequence of events and the interplay of the
major characters" sufficient to support an infringement claim,
there seems little question, except in the case in which nothing was
ever fixed in tangible form (whether on three-by-five cards or
otherwise), that, when a studio commissions a screenplay from a
"pitch," the underlying pitched story upon which the eventual
screenplay is based will be subject to the author's termination right
thirty-five years later.
B. The 1976 Act and the Previous 1909 Act
An understanding of how the paternalistic termination right is
intended to operate can best be gained by examining its roots in
the earlier, 1909, copyright statute.49 The termination right is sim-
ply a more heavily armored, arguably less ambiguous, and much
45 See FIELD, supra note 42, at 145.
46 Id,
47 It certainly passes Learned Hand's famed abstractions test, in which copyright is only
lost when so much is abstracted out of a screenplay or play script that all that is left is mere
idea. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
48 See 4 NIMMER ON COpr"GHT § 13.03[A] [1] [b], at 13-32.1 to 13-32.2 (1999 ed.) (cita-
tions omitted). Chafee's test is an attempted improvement upon, or modification to, the
Hand abstraction test. "Judge Hand stated that there was no set principle as to when copy-
ing goes beyond ideas to their expression. Professor Zechariah Chafee, starting with the
abstractions test, attempted to define such a principle." Michael L. Sharb, Getting a "Total
Concept Feel" of Copyright Infringement, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 903, 912 (1993).
49 Copyright Act, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
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more indefeasible variation of what the 1909 Act attempted to do
through the creation of a pair of twenty-eight year copyright terms;
The second term was intended to revert to the author in order to
accomplish the same goals as the present termination right,
namely, to protect authors from improvident bargains they might
reach early in their careers, and collaterally, to allow for the pros-
pect that works of authorship might skyrocket in value far beyond
their author's wildest (and earliest) predictions.5 ° That plan, how-
ever, was abruptly aborted by a rather infamous Supreme Court
decision, Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons,51 in which the
Court rejected the clearly paternalistic motives of the 1909 Act in
favor of its own latter-day affection for the principles of autonomy,
capitalism, and the free enterprise system, saying-probably some-
what disingenuously-that it was not for the Court to "import into
Congressional legislation a denial to authors of the freedom to dis-
pose of their property possessed by others."5 2
It was Fisher, in fact, that Congress directly addressed in creat-
ing the termination right.5" The Supreme Court had earlier recog-
nized, in Fox Film Corp. v. Knowles54 that the author had a separate
proprietary interest in the second term, which was designed to re-
mediate hasty sales by imprudent and often inexperienced authors.
Fisher held that the second term was nevertheless defeasible by an
author who exercised his power to assign the right to register the
second term in the assignee's name.55 In other words, under Fisher,
publishers could obtain from an author not only all rights in the
author's first term, but also an enforceable contractual obligation
to assign to the publisher the second term as well.56
The 1976 Act is designed to prevent such erosions of the au-
50 See Fox Film Corp. v. Knowles, 261 U.S. 326, 327 (1923).
51 318 U.S. 643 (1943).
52 Id. at 657.
53 See SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM.
OF THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDIES PREPARED PUR-
SUANT TO S. RES. 240, RENEWAL OF COPYRIGHT, STUDY No. 31, at 160-63 (Comm. Print 1961)
(Barbara Ringer).
54 261 U.S. at 327.
55 "Concededly, the author can assign the original copyright and, after he has secured
it, the renewal copyright as well." Fisher, 318 U.S. at 645.
56 This power to assign the second term to the publisher was later held to be qualified
by the requirement that the author be alive at the time of expiration of the first term. See
Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990). It
is doubtful that the Fisher court gave this sufficient attention, but by the time the issue
became viable, the Court seemed far more sympathetic to authors and their families, and
less so towards publishers. As a result, an exception to the Fisher holding was eventually
recognized, but with arguable significance in practical economic terms, since except for
the possibility of the author's death, publishers could be relatively assured of receiving all
possible copyright. More importantly, as a result of Fisher, authors lost the admittedly pa-
ternalistic protections originally intended.
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thor's future right to terminate, and to assure that "[t]ermination
of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the
contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any
future grant. '5 7 The Act's language is sufficiently broad and clear
to prevent another decision similar to Fisher, and is unambiguously
a "denial to authors of the freedom to dispose of their property"
decried by that Court.58  The intent of Congress has been
respected so far. However, the provision creating the termination
right was enacted into law in 1978, and the right does not mature
until thirty-five years after initial assignment. Therefore, there has
not yet been a substantial amount of litigation on this issue. With
the exception of a few cases that have gnawed at the farthest pe-
ripheries of the termination right, 9 it is not clear that the termina-
tion right will be respected. In fact, the disaster of Fisher may well
be repeated. Corporate hope apparently springs eternal from the
lawyer's breast. An examination of recent screenwriter agreements
evidences either an apparent ignorance of the termination right or
an irrepressible belief that it can be defeated again.
II. DERIVATIVE WORKS AND THE TERMINATION RIGHT
As noted above, the exercise of a termination right does not
remove the rights to already prepared derivative works.6" This fea-
ture of the termination right was expressly adopted to avoid the
result of the "broad interpretation" in G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc.61 Under this interpretation, the assignment of a re-
newal right to the producers of a derivative work would not be ef-
fective if the author died before the renewal occurred; this is
because the renewal right had not yet vested in the author. Upon
his death, his heirs, who would not be bound by the assignment,
could renew free from any encumbrances.6 2 The heirs could then,
in theory, sue and enjoin the derivative work from further infringe-
ments of the renewed copyright term,6" since they would own the
renewal period without being subject to any assignments.
57 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (5) (1997). See also id. § 304(c) (5).
58 Fisher, 318 U.S. at 657.
59 For instance, courts have debated whether the written instrument evidencing the
agreement-required to create as well as evidence a work for hire (which is immune from
the termination right)-must exist at the time of agreement. See Schiller & Schmidt, Inc.
v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).
60 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1).
61 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1951). See Mills, 469 U.S. at 183-84 (White, J., dissenting).
62 "A copyright renewal creates a new estate, and the few cases which have dealt with
the subject assert that the new estate is clear of all rights, interests or licenses granted
under the original copyright." Ricordi, 189 F.2d at 471.
63 See Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960).
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The general view by both courts and commentators64 was that
derivative works were not protected in the event of an author's pre-
mature death. In connection with the drafting of the 1976 Act, the
former Register of Copyrights testified that derivative works were
subject to such attack.65 In Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, the Supreme
Court implied that "the broad interpretation" of Ricordi might have
been an overreaction.66 However, the case cited by the Supreme
Court6 7 was not decided until after the 1976 Act was promulgated.
Thus, one may conclude that the 1976 Act alone caused one court
to rethink the arguably draconian treatment that the 1909 Act was
earlier thought to give to derivative works. However, such a posi-
tion is tenable, since an equally prestigious circuit issued a contrary
decision two years later, well after the 1976 Act had been fully
enacted.68
Despite the opinion in Mills, it seems clear that the relative
clarity of the derivative works exception was both necessary and
desirable. Regardless, the new 1976 Act, in adopting the termina-
tion right, included the following derivative works exception:
A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before
its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of
the grant after its termination, but this privilege does not extend
to the preparation after the termination of other derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work covered by the termi-
nated grant.6
9
The effects of the above provision upon a terminating author
are extremely important. If the existing derivative works have ex-
hausted the possible economic value of the copyright, the termina-
tion right gives the author very little value. However, the
likelihood that existing derivative works truly exhaust the copy-
right's value are very slim. The fact that studios have tried their
best to nullify termination rights7" is the best indication that those
64 See Seymour M. Bricker, Renewal and Extension of Copyright, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 43
(1955); Melniker & Melniker, Termination of Transfers and Licenses Under the New Copyright
Law, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 589, 612 (1977); Note, Derivative Copyright and the 1909 Act-
New Clarity or Confusion?, 44 BROOK. L. REV. 905, 928 (1978).
65 See SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COM-
MIrTEE OF THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDIES PRE-
PARED PURSUANT TO S. RES. 240, RENEWAL OF COPYRIGHT, STUDY No. 31, at 69 (Comm. Print
1961) (Barbara Ringer).
66 See Mills, 469 U.S. 153, 183 n.7 (White, J., dissenting).
67 See Rohauer v. Killiarn Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977) (adopting the more
preferable "narrower interpretation").
68 See Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1979).
69 17 U.S.C. § 203(b) (1) (1997).
70 See infra Part IV.B.
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with the expertise to judge whether they have anything to lose have
answered, sotto voce, in the affirmative.71
III. FOREIGN COROLLARIES TO THE TERMINATION RIGHT
Textually speaking, there seems to be no corollary in other
legal systems to the U.S. termination right. In an ongoing phe-
nomenon, the U.S. has been remarkably slow in adopting stan-
dards that have been international for decades.7 2 Most other
countries had a very long copyright term, either lifetime or lifetime
plus some amount of years, while the U.S. was still engaged in the
dual twenty-eight year terms specified by the 1909 Act.7" It is only
in the last two decades that we have adopted provisions shared by
most other countries, and our assimilation is merely due to our
desire to become party to the Berne Convention, which demands a
term dependent upon the lifetime of the author." Notably, we
have yet to truly comply with one particular and important require-
ment of Berne that most resembles the termination right; namely,
moral rights.75
Termination rights are effectively the U.S. corollary to moral
rights. The one distinguishing factor of moral rights is that they
are not economic rights by definition. Moral rights cannot be
transferred, assigned, or alienated in any way.76 The essence of
moral rights is that the author cannot be defeased of them.77 Be-
cause some authors, to the extent they had not conveyed away
these rights, could make claims sounding in defamation, contract,
or even trademark law, the U.S. claimed it had the equivalent of
71 Record producers recently succeeded in adding their category, sound recordings, to
the small list of specially commissioned works (from which the termination right can be
excluded) that are eligible for work-for-hire status, underlining the obvious importance of
the' issue to the entertainment industry. See Intellectual Property and Communications
Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, § 1011, S. 1948, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536
(1999) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 101).
72 See William F. Patry, The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Or How Publishers Man-
aged to Steal the Bread from Authors, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 661, 668 (1996).
73 See id.
74 See id. at 669.
75 In fact, the termination right resembles quite strongly, in a formal sense, the conti-
nental moral right that authors have over a transfer when the work has been treated, or
mistreated, in certain ways. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and
the Enhancement of Author Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERs L.J. 347, 388
(1993).
76 See Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under
French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 480 (1968).
77 "[I]t is 'perpetual, inalienable, and imprescriptible,' and can be donated to the au-
thor's heirs by succession and to third parties by testament." Dane S. Colino, Moral Rights
and Real Obligations: A Property-Law Framework for the Protection of Authors' Moral Rights, 69
TUL. L. REv. 935, 941 (1995).
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moral rights when it joined Berne. 7' However, theunanimous ju-
dicial position had long been that the U.S. had nothing similar to
moral rights. 79 One is hard pressed to find any rights belonging to
authors that cannot be assigned or waived, except for the termina-
tion right.
It is paradoxical that the one so-called moral right incorpo-
rated into our copyright law, entitled the "Visual Artists Rights Act
of 1990,"8" adopted after and in response to our accession to the
Berne Convention as a gesture toward our claim that we possess
moral rights, is not necessarily a true moral right. Authors can
transfer the rights granted by the Act, which is exactly what authors
cannot do with a true moral right.81 The termination right is, how-
ever, a kind of moral right. It cannot be transferred or assigned
"notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary."82
IV. THE SCREENWRITER'S STATUS
Whether an author has a termination right at all depends
upon whether he is a worker for hire. The worker for hire cate-
gory,8" designed specifically to exclude the possibility of a termina-
tion right, potentially embraces screenwriters on two, but only two,
bases.
The first basis applies to an employee.84 A screenwriter who is
employed by a studio, and who writes a script for the studio in the
course of such employment, has no termination right.8 5 However,
the Supreme Court has held that whether an author is an em-
ployee for purposes of worker for hire status is not determined sim-
ply by the agreement made between the author and the
employer.86 Instead, it is a substantive test that inquires into the
conditions of employment. To be a worker for hire without a ter-
mination right requires that the employee satisfy the classic tests of
the master-servant relationship "using principles of general com-
78 See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 1623 Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and Admin. ofJustice of the House Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong.
409 (1988); see also Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1987: Hearings of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 535-36 (1988).
79 "The Copyright Act provides no recognition of the so-called droit mora4 or moral
rights of authors. Nor are such rights recognized in the field of copyright law in the
United States." Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 26 (2d Cir. 1976).
80 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1987).
81 See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (d) ("Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright... may
be transferred . . . ."). Cf supra note 76 and accompanying text.
82 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (5).
83 See id § 101.
84 See id.
85 The termination right is not applicable to a worker for hire. See id.
86 See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989).
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mon law of agency,"87 such as whether the employer dictates the
terms and details of the work, whether the employee works a sched-
uled number of hours and days determined by the employer,
whether the employee is provided the tools and place of his em-
ployment by the employer, and similar well-known factors.
Although the studio writer of the 1930s might have satisfied
some of those factors, the modem screenwriter clearly does not
work under such conditions. The modern screenwriter is an in-
dependent contractor who works in his own office or home, by his
own schedule, and determines almost all the details of his work.88
Such an independent contractor cannot be a worker for hire
under the employee test.
The second basis is that of the specially commissioned work.89
Not all specially commissioned works are included within the work
for hire definition. Rather, under the 1976 Act, an infinitesimally
small list of potential specially commissioned works are eligible to
be treated as works for hire." For instance, one example that
would not be included is a specially commissioned portrait. Thus,
painters who produce such works can never be deprived of their
right to terminate their copyrights in these works of authorship.
The drafters of the 1976 Act were, therefore, subjected to strong
industry pressure during the drafting process to include certain
categories of works in the work for hire definition. The success of
the motion picture lobby is evident, because motion pictures were
included in the list of possible specially commissioned works.91 It is
thus clear that if the appropriate procedures and requirements are
honored, screenwriters can be specially commissioned so that they
do not have termination rights.
87 Id. The Court explained that the worker for hire status is to be determined by
ascertaining:
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of
the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the
hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the
extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the
method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants;
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the
hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treat-
ment of the hired party.
Id. at 751-52.
88 The studio system ceased to exist around 1950, and with it so did the idea of writers
who were actually full-time employees working on the lot. See McKEF, supra note 29, at 415.
89 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "work for hire").
90 See 17 U.S.C. § 101; supra note 1.
91 See 17 U.S.C. § 101. There were originally nine categories of works that could qualify
as specially commissioned works for hire. On November 29, 1999, sound recordings were
added as an additional category. See Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus
Reform Act of 1999, § 1011, S. 1948, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (1999) (amending
17 U.S.C. § 101). See also supra note 1.
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Among those requirements, however, is that the work be pro-
duced pursuant to the commission, and not prior to it.92 It is not
possible for a work already existing (and therefore already subject
to a termination right that cannot be lost "notwithstanding any
agreement to the contrary") to be converted into a specially com-
missioned work.9" Any agreement subsequent to the work's crea-
tion to convert it into a work for hire would constitute exactly the
"agreement to the contrary" that section 203 forbids.94 Clearly,
once a work is produced by an author, copyright subsists in it from
the moment of fixation,95 complete with its termination right, and
it cannot thereafter become a specially commissioned work.
Thus, pursuant to section 101, the only way a screenplay can
become a work for hire is if it results from an agreement by which
the author consents to create a specially commissioned work that
will be authored as a work for hire.96 Most importantly therefore,
screenwriters who show up at the producer's office with preexisting
work-whether it be a pitch written on note cards, an outline, or a
treatment-can certainly produce a future work as a specially com-
missioned work that will not be subject to a termination right as a
work for hire.97 However, the pitch, outline, or treatment itself will
never be a work for hire, and will always be subject to the author's
termination right.
What, then, is the relation between the pitch, outline, or treat-
ment (with respect to which the author's termination right can
never be defeased) and the final screenplay produced as a specially
commissioned work (that, as a work for hire, cannot be termi-
92 For legislative intent, see 1964 Revision Bill with Discussion and Comments, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 145 (1965) (testimony of Barbara Ringer, former Register of Copyrights), reprinted
in H.R. REP. No. 51-374, pt. 5, at 145 (1965). The courts appear unanimous that the par-
ties must agree before creation of the work that it is to be a work for hire. Judge Posner
has held, in Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992), that
the agreement must also be reduced to writing before the work is created. Others have
held that, as long as the agreement precedes creation of the work, it is not fatal if the
agreement is not reduced to writing until later. See Playboy Enters. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 559
(2d Cir. 1995). But there is unanimity that the agreement must occur prior to creation.
93 This could be done, presumably, only by agreement-an agreement that is prohib-
ited by the "notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary" language.
94 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (listing items that, if specially commissioned, are works for hire);
supra note 1. Portraits are not included in the work for hire categories; therefore, such a
portrait would not qualify as a work made for hire, simply on the basis of being specially
commissioned.
95 "Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
96 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 203.
97 This could be, in fact, exactly the situation contemplated by the statute's "work for
hire" provision. See id § 101.
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nated)? To the extent.that the ultimate screenplay is based upon
the original pitch, outline, or treatment, the screenplay is a deriva-
tive work,98 while the pitch, outline, or treatment is called the "un-
derlying work." The author's nonassignable and indefeasible right
to terminate any assignment of that underlying work will be dis-
cussed below.
A. The Screenwriter's Contract
A screenwriter's contract is not subject to any formal con-
straints and may adopt whatever substance and form the con-
tracting parties choose, except for the termination right, which
cannot be extinguished despite a contrary intention of the parties.
Nevertheless, due to various social and historical factors, including
the dominant status of the major studios during the past century,
most screenwriters' contracts follow a standard form.99 The form
has changed over the years, but at all times most screenwriters'
contracts have had a certain uniformity. Uniformity is even more
prevalent because most screenwriters and studios are arguably sub-
ject to union contracts under the purview of the Writers Guild of
America ("WGA").' °°
The WGA's basic contract, entitled the "1995 Writers Guild of
America Theatrical and Television Basic Agreement" ("1995 WGA
MBA"), does not mention the termination right. The 1995 WGA
MBA treats any work produced within the bounds of its jurisdiction
as a work for hire, and thus not eligible for the termination
right.101 This treatment is because of the WGA's view of itself as a
labor union and the contract as an industry agreement covering all
of its member writers who work as employees under that con-
tract. 10 2 Whether the WGA is correct about the status of their writ-
ers, thus conferring upon them no termination rights under the
98 A "'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." Id. § 101.
99 See generally WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, 1995 WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA THEATRICAL
AND TELEVISION BASIC AGREEMENT-ABC, CBS AND NBC (1995) [hereinafter 1995 WGA
MBA].
100 All three television networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC), the major studios, and almost
all-numbering several hundred-of the independent producers, are party to the WGA
agreement. See id. at 1-9.
101 The definition of a "writer" is carefully tailored-whether or not, of course, it
matches the actual facts of the employment relationship-to fit the "work for hire" defini-
tion: "A 'writer' is a person who is: (i) employed by the Company to write literary material
... where the Company has the right by contract to direct the performance of personal
services in writing or preparing such material...." Id. art. 1, (B) (1) (a) (i), at 14.
102 See American Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Writers Guild of Am., West, Inc., 437 U.S. 411
(1978). "The WGA is a labor union which was certified as the collective bargaining repre-
[Vol. 18:93
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copyright law, seems problematical, but is beyond the scope of this
article. The WGA presumes that substantially all its members are
either employees or are specially commissioned to produce works
for motion pictures, and therefore, the resulting screen- and tele-
plays are works for hire under section 101.103 Therefore, when
writers come to the WGA with pre-existing underlying works, those
underlying works are terminable.
The premise of the Writers Guild Contract (that the member-
writers are all engaged in works for hire) can be examined without
resolving all the implications of a conclusion that the premise
might be incorrect. 104 WGA members can create works for hire
only under the two conditions previously discussed.0 5 Either writ-
ers work as employees under the Supreme Court's construction of
that status as articulated in Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid,10 6 or they create specially commissioned works under section
101.107 It is highly doubtful that WGA members are working as
employees under the Reid test.108 WGA members, therefore, only
become workers for hire from the moment they are specially com-
missioned, because it is the special commission and not a naked
agreement absent that commission, which creates the worker for
hire status.
It seems beyond argument that until a WGA member is techni-
cally hired to create a specific script, any underlying work already
committed to writing, or "fixed in tangible form" as the 1976 Act
expresses it, is a preexisting work subject to a termination right
that cannot be affected by the MBA.
The WGA probably views its members as continuing employ-
ees of the various producing companies that are parties to the 1995
WGA MBA. However, they are not employees in the sense of the
section 101 definition of work for hire, because they do not satisfy
sentative of screenwriters in the movie industry." Marino v. Writers Guild of Am., East,
Inc., 992 F.2d 1480, 1481 (9th Cir. 1993).
103 See 1995 WGA MBA, art. 1, (B) (1) (a) (i), at 14; supra note 97.
104 These implications would include, for instance, the collective bargaining status of
the Guild and the enforceability of the collective bargaining agreement.
105 See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
106 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
107 These are the only two categories of workers for hire allowed by the statute. See 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1997).
108 While the complete argument of Reid is beyond the scope of this article, the reader
should understand that Reid expressly rejected the test of employee status as being either
the right to control or even actual control that had been urged by the respondent in that
case. Thus, it does not matter that the studios have the right or actually exercise the right
to control what the writers do. Reid stands for the proposition that the factors mentioned
earlier are decisive, and not solely whether the employer can or does exercise control. See
supra text accompanying note 87.
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any of the requirements set forth in Reid.109 It seems quite prob-
able that the drafters of the 1995 WGA MBA have proceeded on
the basis of the old "right to control" test, formerly accepted by
many courts, 110 but roundly rejected in Reid.111 The 1995 WGA
MBA uses the outmoded "right to control" terminology in defining
the status of its members.1 12 In terms of section 101, WGA mem-
bers do not become subject to work for hire status until they are
commissioned to work on a particular project, and any underlying
works they bring to that task remain inalienably subject to the
writer's termination right.
1. The Writers Guild "Separation of Rights" and Treatment of
Preexisting Underlying Works
One of the relatively novel features of the 1995 WGA MBA is
the attempt to provide writers with a right to exploit the work in
various areas, particularly publication and dramatic rights, if the
production company fails to do so within a defined number of
years.113 This is called "separation of rights." '1 14 If the story or prin-
cipal characters are dictated by the production company, separa-
tion rights are not granted.115 The 1995 WGA MBA explicitly
distinguishes between separable matter created by the author and
109 Although the 1995 WGA MBA attempts to forbid "speculative" writing, it only does so
in the context of an explicit request by a signatory company that a writer undertake such
speculative, or contingent, assignment. See generally 1995 WGA MBA art. 20, (A), (B), at
195-98. To the extent, however, that a WGA member freely "pitches" a story to a company,
the 1995 WGA MBA does not seem to forbid it; more importantly, the Basic Agreement
would govern the company-writer relationship, and the MBA simply defines the relation-
ship as one of a work for hire.
110 See Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publ'g Co., 810 F.2d 410 (4th Cir.
1987); Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1986); Aldon
Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984); Siegel v. National Periodical
Publications, Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1974); Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457
F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972); Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 500 (2d Cir.
1969); Brattleboro Publ'g Co. v. Winmill Publ'g Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567-68 (2d Cir. 1966);
Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
111 "In sum, we must reject petitioners' argument. Transforming a commissioned work
into a work by an employee on the basis of the hiring party's right to control, or actual
control of, the work is inconsistent with the language, structure, and legislative history of
the work for hire provisions." Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
750 (1989).
112 "A 'writer' is a person who is: employed by the Company to write literary material...
where the Company has the right by contract to direct the performance of personal serv-
ices in writing or preparing such material .. " 1995 WGA MBA art. 1, (B) (1) (a), at 14.
See also 1995 WGA MBA art. 1, (C) (1) (a) (ii), at 18. Of course, this is not simply a draft-
ing problem. Reid clarified that it is a substantive issue that cannot be resolved, in any way,
by a formal process of simply relabelling independent contractors as workers for hire.
113 See id. art. 16, at 145-81.
114 Id.
115 See id. art. 16, (A)(2)(a), (b), at 145-46.
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non-separable matter owing its origin to a different source. 16
Given that the industry is renowned for its rapaciousness, this
valuable right is without question a considerable accomplishment
by the WGA on behalf of its members. Curiously, however, the sep-
aration of rights closely resembles some of the results of the termi-
nation right, particularly as applied to "professional writers" (a
term used in the 1995 WGA MBA) who have come to the produc-
tion company with a preexisting underlying work.1 17 Upon termi-
nation of copyright assignments, authors would have the right to
exploit their works in all areas, including those areas that had not
been exploited by the production company at that time. In addi-
tion, "merchandising rights," which are available to many writ-
ers, 11s are almost certainly among those rights that an author
exercising his termination right, would reacquire as a result of ter-
minating an assignment of copyright.119
Why is the 1995 WGA MBA silent as to termination rights?
One reason may be that the success of bargaining for separation of
rights depended, at least in part, upon authors' claims that fairness
required that an author be able to exploit his creations to the ex-
tent that the production company was not doing so. Had the WGA
emphasized, or perhaps even mentioned, that authors would have
complete rights to exploit their works without regard to collective
bargaining, the production companies might well have decided
that authors already occupied a favored position, and indeed, that
favored position was not even subject to negotiation, since the ter-
mination right cannot be alienated. Thus, the termination right in
a sense is a potential burden to authors wishing to enhance their
positions beyond what the termination right already gives them be-
cause they cannot use the termination right as a bargaining chip.
Finally, of course, it is clear that the 1995 WGA MBA is a collective
bargaining agreement that necessarily views its members as em-
ployees of the industry. As such, at least in the eyes of the 1995
WGA MBA, they are workers for hire. Whether this represents a
potential sacrifice of their members' interests in the termination
rights to underlying preexisting works is a serious question.
116 "Separable material shall not include any assigned material or source material. ....
I& art. 16, (A)(4), at 155.
117 Id. art. 16, (A)(2), at 145.
118 See id. art. 1, (B)(8), at 17.
119 Despite the fact that a terminating author cannot terminate derivative works that
have already been prepared, it seems likely that such a terminating author could neverthe-
less market all kinds of subsidiary creations, such as T-shirts, toys, dolls, and the like, that
form a major part of the economic value of motion picture properties. See supra note 28.
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B. The Termination Right and Standard Contract Practice
The motion picture industry has not explicitly recognized the
termination right in any of the standard contracts currently in use,
despite the fact that the termination right and the 1976 Act are
now more than two decades old. Virtually all, if not all, of the stan-
dard industry contracts treat the relationship between author and
production house as one to which no termination right applies.121
Worse, the few which, even if only tangentially, acknowledge the
possibility of a termination right treat it as something that can be
almost scornfully disregarded or perverted to the production
house's advantage.
For instance, in one standard contract governing, of all things,
freelance television writers (who more often than most "pitch"
their ideas prior to contract), the unacknowledged termination
right is treated as if nullified by the creation of a worker for hire
relationship. 12' Then, quite amazingly, the contract goes on to
provide that if the relationship is found not to be a work for hire,
the author agrees to assign all rights to the production house nev-
ertheless, without mention of the fact that if the worker for hire
status fails the author automatically gains an inalienable right to
terminate:
6. Copyright - Work Made For Hire
The Writer acknowledges and agrees that all copyrightable work
product prepared under this Agreement are contributions to a
motion picture or other audio visual work, or to a collective
work, and as such the work is a "work made for hire" under
section 101 (2) of the Copyright Act of 1976. All copyrights to
the work shall belong to the Company as the statutory author.
In the event that the work is deemed by a court of competent
authority to no [sic] be a "work made for hire," Writer immedi-
ately assigns all right, title, and interest in and to the works pre-
pared under this Agreement. 122
This is, of course, somewhat troublesome. While the language
of the contract is textually unassailable, its impact and undeniable
intent is deceptive. The contract addresses writing "prepared
under this agreement," because, in fact, any underlying preexisting
work (such as a "pitch") cannot be so included. 12' But if it means
by this to exclude the pitch from its terms, then the author does
120 This is, of course, a direct result of their claims that the writing is a "work for hire."
121 See Alexander Lindey, 2 Lindey on Entertainment, Publishing and the Arts (CBC)
Form 6.03-4.1, at 6-62.1 to 6-62.2 (Oct. 1997).
122 Id.
123 Such a work would certainly not be specifically commissioned, and, if prepared prior
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not need a termination right since the pitch is not being conveyed.
If, on the other hand, the contract is intended to include the un-
derlying preexisting work, it cannot thereby be a work for hire,
since the pitch was not prepared under any special commission,
but instead preceded it. If any part of the agreement fails to be a
work for hire, the author cannot grant, and the company cannot
bargain for, "all right, title, and interest," since the termination
right cannot be conveyed (in fact, it appears to be exactly this kind
of agreement that section 203 anticipated when it declared the ter-
mination right inalienable "notwithstanding" such agreements).124
Yet this is the practice in the entertainment industry and in related
industries.1 25
Furthermore, the termination right seldom appears as an im-
portant topic in entertainment law treatises. For instance, in one
standard industry reference it appears as an afterthought, as a
"Practice Comment" in which the termination object is referred to
by way of a "caveat," which concludes with the following (somewhat
equivocal) advice: "Purchasers should consider the above regard-
ing any transfer of ownership of any copyrighted property."126 In
the same reference work, readers are warned that the work for hire
doctrine does not apply to underlying works; but, despite the fact
that the doctrine is an industry standard, the text fails to note that
pitches, outlines, and treatments are eligible to be treated as un-
derlying works. 127
This, of course, will not apply to an underlying novel, short
story, or play upon which the movie was based. Such works will
be owned by the author, unless they are assigned to the studio
or production company. It should be noted that if such under-
lying works, or rights to such underlying works have been as-
signed, then the termination provisions of Section 203 or 304
will apply.
128
By applying this to such discrete categories as novels, short sto-
ries, and plays, the text has the effect, however unintended, of fail-
to the contract, similarly could not be a product of an employment relationship. See 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1997).
124 See id. § 203(a) (5).
125 The computer industry also attempts to specially commission software (for instance,
as works for hire), and its contracts commonly state that "if it does not qualify as a Work for
Hire, Contractor will ... assign... all of his/her rights, title, and interest ...." Work For
Hire Agreement, MULTIMEDIA AND TECHNOLOGY LICENSING LAW REPORT, at 8 (Feb. 1995).
126 Alexander Lindey, Lindey on Entertainment, Publishing and the Arts (MB) Form
5.01-1 practice cmt., at 5-15 (Oct. 1995).
127 See id.
128 Alexander Lindey, 2 Lindey on Entertainment, Publishing and the Arts (West
Group) § 5.04[10] [mm], at 5-274 (Mar. 1998).
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ing to advise the reader that any preexisting underlying work
(whether or not it falls into established literary categories, such as
novels, short stories and plays) is entitled to the termination right.
Because this text specifically addresses the motion picture industry,
it seems particularly desirable that it should tell authors of rights
about which they may be unaware, in terms that identify, rather
than conceal, the full potential of those rights.
Reference works sometimes note that mistakes or bad drafts-
manship may cause a work to fail to qualify as a work for hire. But
even then, no mention is made of the fact that, upon such failure,
the studio can never regain the work such as to avoid termination.
Because television shows would fall under the category of "au-
diovisual works" commissioning parties of parts of television
shows may still be classified as the statutory authors... provided
that the contract states that the work is to be a "work made for
hire." Failure to sign such an instrument will take the commis-
sioned work out of Section 101 (2) .... As a result, the commis-
sioned party will probably not be the statutory "employee," and
authorship and ownership will vest with the commissioned artist
or writer. 129
This may seem inoffensive, but it is essential to note that if a
work fails to qualify as a work made for hire, most industry con-
tracts treat it as a work in which the author assigns all rights and
title to the production house.13° As a result, informing the reader
that a work may not be a work for hire, without advising the author
that, in such an event, the author has an inalienable right to termi-
nate, is not very useful and to the unsophisticated author would
very likely be considered deceptive. Furthermore, the above pas-
sage does not mention that even if the contract states that the work
is one for hire, such a statement does not automatically make it so,
nor does it make the commissioning party a statutory author.
One way in which production houses try to insure that the
work they are purchasing is a work for hire, free from any termina-
tion right, is to hire an outside writer through the writer's "loan-out
company. "131 Loan-out companies, originally designed for tax pur-
poses, are the vehicles by which production companies acquire the
129 Alexander Lindey, 2 Lindey on Entertainment, Publishing and the Arts (West
Group) § 6.07[3] [oo], at 6-194 to 6-195 (Mar. 1999).
130 See, e.g., Alexander Lindey, 2 Lindey on Entertainment, Publishing and the Arts
(CBC) Form 6.03-4.1, at 6-62.1 to 6-62.2 (Oct. 1997).
131 See Mary LaFrance, The Separate Tax Status of Loan-Out Corporations, 48 VAND. L. REV.
879 (1995). As a matter of legal form, the production house contracts with the loan-out
company, but in actuality, it is dealing with the loan-out company's sole stockholder-the
writer.
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services of a writer who, employed by his own loan-out company, is
already a worker for hire. Unfortunately for the production
houses, however, it is not clear that such writers are truly employ-
ees under the work for hire doctrine, especially under Reid.
1 1 2
Such writers are probably employees for purposes of the tax
code,133 but, because they are not within the common law agency
rules articulated by Reid,13 4 the works they produce are probably
not works for hire. It is clear, however, that production companies
have not considered this, because the standard loan-out agreement
between a writer and his own loan-out company provides that:
Employee hereby grants, transfers and sets over to Corporation,
and Corporation shall be entitled to and shall own solely and
exclusively, forever and without limitation and for all purposes,
each and every and all rights and interests of any and every kind
and character whatsoever in and to all of the results and pro-
ceeds of Employee's services hereunder. 5
The commentary to this term is quite explicit in explaining
that its language is designed "so that the loan-out company can in
turn make a grant of rights to a production company."136
Perhaps the termination right is too new to be recognized in
its full dimensions, even at this late date. Perhaps it takes effect too
far in the future to be considered important by many authors. But
even the one area where such long-range planning is normal, tax
and estate planning, standard reference works seem to give the ter-
mination right short or no shrift. For instance, one such work
poses the following questions:
[D]oes the right of termination make it impossible, for gift tax
purposes, for the author to make a gift of part or all of the copy-
right, since the author may exercise the right of termination at
some future date so as to retrieve the transferred copyright?
Does the right of termination make it impossible for the author
to sell the copyright, for income tax purposes, for a similar
reason?13 7
According to this standard industry treatise, "[t] he short, most
132 Reid makes it clear that determination of employee status is to be governed by com-
mon law agency rules, and not by, for instance, the tax code. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 750-51;
supra text accompanying note 84.
133 See LaFrance, supra note 131, at 929-51.
134 See supra note 108.
135 Alexander Lindey, Lindey on Entertainment, Publishing and the Arts (MB) Form 7-1
cl. 11, at 7-15 (Sept. 1991).
136 Id. Form 7-1 cmt. 11, at 7-15.
137 Norman M. Rosenberg, Tax and Estate Planning For Authors, in Alexander Lindey,
Lindey on Entertainment, Publishing and the Arts (MB) 59.01[1], at 59-6 (Sept. 1994).
2000]
HeinOnline  -- 18 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 117 2000
118 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT
probable answer to these questions is 'no'. "18 But in all likeli-
hood, that answer is neither probable nor short, and all such tax
questions might have to be answered by taking into account the
difference in value between the assignment of copyright free of a
termination right (that is, as a work for hire) and the copyright
potentially shortened by termination.
Even where the possibility of an underlying work is expressly
recognized, the industry still seems unwilling to recognize the im-
possibility of acquiring all rights in the work. A standard reference
work, in discussing the 1995 WGA MBA, notes two possibilities: an
author is either specially commissioned to work on something pro-
vided by the production house, or "the writer owns the underlying
literary property and assigns it to the producer." '139 In the latter
case, the treatise says, "the producer may have to acquire owner-
ship in the underlying property on which the writer has based, or
intends to base, the screenplay.' 140 Once more, no mention is
made of the fact that, in that circumstance, the producer can never
acquire the property free of the author's termination right.
In virtually every industry contract, an author is required to
provide a "Certificate of Authorship," which asserts that the author
owns copyright in any underlying work, and conveys all rights to
the production house.141 This, of course, is either inconsistent
with the existence of a termination right or, at the least, is less than
candid in that regard. The Certificate of Authorship, a standard
part of virtually all industry contracts, is expressly designed to sat-
isfy the requirement in section 101 that work for hire status be
manifested by a written agreement for specially commissioned
works. 4 2 But the language of the standard Certificate of Author-
ship is far more problematic than its express purposes would dic-
tate. The Certificate states that, "all literary material of whatever
kind or nature.., submitted and to be submitted by Writer... in
connection with a motion picture ... was written and will be writ-
ten by Writer as a work-made-for-hire . . . specially ordered or
commissioned. 143
138 Id.
139 Steve Breimer, What to Know about the Legal Provisions Contained in Scripturiting Assign-
ment Contracts, in ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING, 'AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 404-05 (Viera et
al., eds., 1997).
140 Alexander Lindey, Lindey on Entertainment, Publishing and the Arts (MB) 8.01,
at 8-4 (Mar. 1995).
141 See Breimer, supra note 139. See also Alexander Lindey, Lindey on Entertainment,
Publishing and the Arts (MB) Form 8-2 cl. 1 (a)(1), at 8-96 (Mar. 1995).
142 See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
143 Alexander Lindey, Lindey on Entertainment, Publishing and the Arts (MB) Form 5-9
cl. 1, at 5-42 (Dec. 1996).
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The problem with this language is that it treats the work as
one specially ordered or commissioned, and thus a work for hire,
yet it expressly attempts to cover preexisting underlying works by
using the words "submitted" and "was written." Clearly, such pre-
existing works cannot have been specially commissioned in all
cases; it is exactly this type of preexisting underlying work that this
article addresses. Therefore, despite this written agreement, the
author to whom it applies cannot be deprived of his termination
right.144 Nevertheless, these certificates are apparently routinely
used to attempt to convert into works for hire all kinds of preexist
ing works which, as a matter of law, cannot ever become such
works for hire.145
Frequently, a production company may issue to an author a
letter of intent, which will then be included in a package assembled
to gain financing for the project.146 Although the letter of intent is
generally legally unenforceable on its own, the terms of such a let-
ter of intent tend to demonstrate how the industry views preexist
ing works, and indicate a general ignorance of termination rights.
The typical letter of intent claims the production company will ac-
quire "all exclusive visual media rights, title and interests, of every
kind and character whatsoever ... in perpetuity and throughout
the universe ... ."" No matter how legally unenforceable the
letter is, once it is understood that a letter of intent covers, by defi-
nition, only preexisting works, the incredibly broad reach of its lan-
guage is simply inexplicable. It is certainly the letter of intent,
covering only preexisting works, which, of all documents, should
address in some way the fact that the author will retain the right to
terminate some thirty-five years later.
The ignorance or studied disregard of the termination right
by the entertainment industry is not so different than that of the
legal profession generally. In a guide by the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York14 that is "intended for lawyers who are not
actively engaged in ... entertainment law, but who occasionally are
involved ... and for non-lawyers who have an interest . . . " the
144 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5). There is always the possibility that the Certificate of Au-
thorship merely confirms a previous agreement to produce a specially commissioned work.
If so, its ambiguity and potential for abuse demonstrates why Judge Posner, and others, are
of the view that the written document as well as the agreement should precede any work
done for hire. See Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).
145 See infra text accompanying note 135.
146 See Breimer, supra note 139.
147 Alexander Lindey, Lindey on Entertainment, Publishing and the Arts (MB) Form 5-8
cl. 1, at 5-39 (Dec. 1996).
148 COMMITTEE ON ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS LAW OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, GUIDE TO THE ACQUISITION OF RIGHTS (1990).
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existence of underlying works is treated in depth, but the termina-
tion right is never mentioned. Worker for hire status is also dis-
cussed, and where the author is not for hire, the guide suggests
that the author "may be required to transfer rights to the producer
pursuant to an 'acquisition agreement."" 49 The potential unfair-
ness of this, is of course, not limited to authors, but also applies to
unsophisticated producers (so-called "independents," for instance)
who may be misled about the potential breadth of what rights may
be acquired. The unfairness to producers (whose economic calcu-
lations never extend as far as thirty-five years into the future) of
course, is certainly far less than that to authors (who, thirty-five
years later, may well have an interest in terminating or renegoti-
ating their assignments).
In the few cases in which modern industry contracts directly
address the termination right, there is an attempt-surely unen-
forceable-to turn it to the production house's advantage, most
notably by attempting to convert it into a right of first refusal.
If, pursuant to any copyright or similar law, Owner becomes en-
titled to exercise any right of... termination ... and Owner
exercises the termination right, then, from and after the date
that Owner has the right .... Purchaser shall have the first right
to purchase from Owner the recaptured rights .... If Purchaser
shall acquire from Owner all or part of the recaptured rights,
then Owner agrees to enter into a written agreement with re-
spect thereto.'50
This provision, however, constitutes exactly that "agreement to
the contrary" notwithstanding which section 203(5) declares termi-
nation can still be effected.' 5 ' The unenforceability of this provi-
sion is made even more clear by the inconsistency of its terms with
the express terms of section 203(6) (D), which provides that termi-
nated assignees can negotiate for a new assignment immediately
after notice of termination is provided, while others must wait a
minimum of two years until termination is actually effected. 15 2 The
combination of these two provisions would seem to make it clear
that the right of first refusal in this industry contract is barred by
both the letter and spirit of the 1976 Act.
149 Id. Introduction, at 3.
150 4 THOMAS D. SELZ, ENTERTAINMENT LAw F-59 (2d ed. 1992).
151 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(5).
152 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(6)(D).
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V. THE TERMINATION RIGHT AND ACTUAL INDUSTRY PRACTICE
Actual entertainment industry contracts, following the lead of
the practice treatises,1 5 3 routinely adopt one or more of the ap-
proaches articulated in the treatises in order to avoid, disguise, or,
worse, violate the termination right. So, for instance, one recent
contract with Walt Disney Studios contains the following onerous
provision on "Rights":
WDPc shall own, and Artist hereby acknowledges WDPc's owner-
ship of, all known or hereafter existing rights of every kind
throughout the universe, in perpetuity and in all languages, pertain-
ing to the Work (including, without limitation, the copyright
therein and any renewals or extensions thereof) for all now
known or hereafter existing uses, media, and forms, including,
without limitation all motion picture, literary, dramatic, musical,
stage, mechanical, merchandising, publishing, radio, free or pay
television, videotape, video disc or other video device, sequel,
remake, ancillary, and allied rights in the Work, and the forego-
ing is inclusive of a full assignment to WDPc thereof. If the Work
is based on an idea or other material created by Artist (the "Property "),
then Artist hereby grants WDPc, subject to any applicable require-
ments of the MBA hereinafter identified, the same rights in the
Property as WDPc has in the Work, and the compensation payable
to Artist hereunder includes payment therefor. All rights in and
to the Work or Property transferred hereunder to WDPc shall
apply with equal force to any and all drafts, arrangements, adapta-
tions, dramatizations, redrafts, revisions, or other versions of the Work
or Property written or created by Artist or with Artist's consent."'
The force and attempted reach of these Disney provisions is
nothing short of stunning. Aside from the typically broad boiler-
plate language, the claim to preexisting underlying works ("an idea
or other material created by Artist" as well as "any and all drafts,
arrangements, adaptations, dramatizations, redrafts, revisions, or
other versions of the Work or Property written or created by Art-
ist") is a barely concealed grab for material that the 1976 Act
clearly reserves to the author with an indefeasible interest secured
153 One might presume that practice treatises actually follow the lead of actual practice;
but this is wrong for at least two reasons. Practitioners consult treatises when drafting con-
tracts, and although the treatises certainly adopt provisions from contracts already written,
this is clearly a two-way street. But treatises also contain commentary, as well as forms, and
the role of commentary in shaping industry contracts, as well as sensitivities, cannot be
ignored.
154 Walt Disney Pictures, Writer Standard Terms and Conditions, B.2. (a) (emphasis
added) (on file with the Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal).
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by the termination right. 155 In short, the Disney Rights clause is an
attempt to deny the very existence of the author's termination
rights in preexisting underlying works and, as such, is a deception
that borders on fraud. The provisions, to the extent they attempt
to frustrate the termination right, are of course unenforceable and
invalid. But an author, reading the available treatises, guides, or
the 1995 WGA MBA would never know that.
Other major studio contracts embrace the same kind of cal-
lous and cavalier contempt for authors' rights. For instance, the
standard MGM Screenplay Option and Purchase Agreement,
grants the studio the
[o]ption to acquire right, title, and interest, throughout the uni-
verse in perpetuity, in and to that certain original screenplay
tided " " . . including without limitation, all contents
thereof, all prior drafts thereof the theme, title and characters
thereof, the copyright thereof, and all renewals and extensions
of such copyright.156
This seems to be very similar to the Disney language in its at-
tempt to deny the existence of an indefeasible author's right in all
underlying works that predate an agreement under which the au-
thor is commissioned to produce future, but certainly not past,
works as works for hire. Even independent production houses,
which might be presumed to treat their writers with more defer-
ence, seem to embrace the same grasping spirit. One project spon-
sored by the renowned Sundance Institute uses the standard
"Certificate of Authorship," which declares that, "[a]ll literary ma-
terial (the 'Screenplay') submitted and to be submitted by me ...
was written and will be written by me as an employee-for-hire ...
and as work-made-for-hire specially ordered or commissioned by
Producer."157
This is so, despite the fact that the option was for a screenplay
that was already completed. Copyright in such a project cannot
make it a work for hire, and the producers, despite their best, or
155 This is a result, of course, of the "notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary"
language of the statute. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (5) (1997).
156 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Inc., Short Form Option Agreement (emphasis ad-
ded) (on file with the Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal).
157 Kalkaska, Inc., Option to Acquire All Motion Picture and Allied Rights Ex. A (1995)
(emphasis added) (agreement related to a screenplay, The Opportunist, on file with the Car-
dozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal). See Thorn Geier, Walken Takes Advantage of 'Oppor-
tunists,' HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Nov. 6, 1998 (the script was "[d]eveloped through the
Sundance Filmakers Lab..."). A variation of the standard Certificate states: "all the results
and process of such services ... are and will be a work made for hire... " Breimer, supra
note 139, at 405 (emphasis added).
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worst, efforts, cannot destroy the authors termination rights
through such a declaration. Again, such provisions are clearly
unenforceable.
What is the significance of an author 'having a termination
right in an underlying pitch, treatment, or outline (whether or not
the production house contract ignores the termination right or,
worse, attempts to deny or pervert it) when already prepared deriv-
ative works will be immune to any termination? Such an author,
owning the underlying work, would have the, opportunity to write
or license sequels based on the original pitch, outline, or treat-
ment.1" 8 He would have the opportunity to market merchandise
based on the underlying work, even though the owners of the de-
rivative work might also have rights to continue to sell already pre-
pared merchandise. He would have the right to use characters and
plot lines and new works based on the underlying work, even
though those characters and plot lines were also present in already
prepared derivative works. In short, authors who originally pitched
their stories to production houses will have the opportunity,
through the termination right, to exploit the underlying work and,
effectively, to compete with the derivative work. Given that, at the
very least, such an author will have something of value with which
to renegotiate her contract with the production house, even with
respect to the already prepared derivative works.
CONCLUSION
The termination provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act were
meant to benefit authors who find themselves, typically or stere-
otypically, in disadvantageous bargaining positions. The entertain-
ment industry, at least in its television and film branches, places
writers in a relatively disadvantaged situation. Those writers, more-
over, commonly have termination rights that cannot be extin-
guished. The practices of the industry, however, are such that the
termination right is unrecognized, or worse, concealed. The at-
tempts to bypass, avoid, or overcome legitimate termination rights
seem clearly barred by the 1976 statute. 159 Importantly, many tele-
vision and movie industry writers present pitches, treatments, or
story outlines to production companies, the assignments of which
will be terminable approximately thirty-five years after assign-
158 See Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir.1982) (demon-
strafing opportunities available to an author who can, unlike in that case, successfully ter-
minate as to both underlying story and character).
159 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (5) (1997).
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ment.16' At that time, authors and their attorneys should be aware
that termination rights may exist in theretofore unrecognized un-
derlying works, despite the fact that the derivative works already
prepared may be immune to the termination right. The termina-
tion rights, aside from those derivative works, may be extremely
valuable, giving writers opportunity to exploit them or to renegoti-
ate their earlier assignments.
160 As noted earlier, this article proceeds on the basis of works that were created after
the effective date of the 1976 Act. However, as noted earlier, the 1976 Act extended protec-
tion for all works produced under and still protected by the earlier 1909 Act, and gave
them all a termination right for the last 19 years of those extended terms (recently ex-
tended by the so-called Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act for an additional 20
years, see 17 U.S.C. § 304). Therefore, the import of this article is applicable to many
works, which are now in their last terms under the 1909 Act. Authors and their lawyers
should be aware of these termination rights.
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